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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brandon Dean Kinglsey appeals from his conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine. Specifically, Kingsley challenges the denial of his 
suppression motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The North Idaho Violent Crimes Task Force was assisting with a probation 
search of Mr. Anderson. (10/11/11 Tr., p.3, Ls.7-25.) When law enforcement 
arrived at Mr. Anderson's home, the saw Kingsley talking on a cell phone while 
standing in the driveway. (10/11/11 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-9.) Because they were there to 
search the home of a probationer who was a known drug dealer, there was a 
concern that "Kingsley was a lookout in the front of the house on his phone." 
(10/11/11 Tr., p.4, Ls.10-12.) 
Detective Todd told Kingsley to get off the phone and asked Kinglsey to 
come to the sidewalk to talk to him. (10/11/11 Tr., p.4, L.22 - p.5, L.4.) When 
Kingsley walked over to where Detective Todd was standing, Detective Todd 
asked Kingsley if he had any weapons. (10/11/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-11.) Kinglsey 
informed the officer that "he had some glass [paraphernalia] on him" and told the 
detective he could take it out of his front sweatshirt pocket. (10/11/11 Tr., p.5, 
Ls.11-21.) The detective found and removed a clear glass pipe in a pouch from 
Kingsley's pocket. (10/11/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.22-25.) Kinglsey then told Detective 
Todd he had a "bindle" in his front left pocket. (10/11/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.4-5.) 
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Detective Todd removed the bindle from Kingsley's pocket and observed it to be 
"a small zip lock style baggie with white crystals inside." (10/11/11 Tr., p.6, 
Ls.15-16.) 
The state charged Kinglsey with possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.26-27.) Kinglsey filed a motion to suppress 
and brief in support asserting Kingsley was searched "without probable cause 
and without reasonable articulable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous 
or engaged in illegal activity." (R., p.52.) Following a hearing on the motion 
where testimony was given and the parties stipulated the preliminary hearing 
transcript be entered into evidence for the court's determination (12/08/11 Tr., 
p.4, L.14 - p.5, L.7), the district court took the motion to suppress under 
advisement, ultimately issuing a memorandum decision and order denying 
defendant's motion to suppress (see R., pp.54-84). 
Kingsley entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress. (R., pp.87-90; 1/12/12 Tr., p.4, L.1 - p.17, L.17.) The court sentenced 
Kingsley to two years fixed followed by two years indeterminate and retained 
jurisdiction for up to one year. (R., pp.96-98; 3/13/12 Tr., p.41, Ls.6-24.) 
Kinglsey timely appeals. 
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ISSUE 
Kingsley states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kingsley's motion to 
suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 




Kingsley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
A Introduction 
The district court denied Kingsley's motion to suppress, concluding 
Kingsley had not been illegally detained or illegally frisked. (R., pp.54-84.) 
Kingsley argues on appeal that he was illegally detained by law enforcement at 
the point "Detective Todd ordered him to get off his cell phone" without having 
reasonable, articulable suspicion to support Kingsley's detention. (Appellant's 
brief, p.4.) Kingsley has failed to show clear error because substantial evidence 
supports the district court's finding, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
that Kingsley was not detained. Additionally, the record supports a conclusion 
that even if there was a detention, it was reasonable in light of the totality of the 
circumstances. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free 
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-
6, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309 
(2004). Whether a consent to search was voluntary is a question of fact, the 
determination of which is reviewed on appeal for clear error. State v. Reynolds, 
146 Idaho 466, 472, 197 P.3d 327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 145 
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Idaho 641,648,181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008). At a suppression hearing, 
the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh 
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. 
Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. 
Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659,662 (Ct. App. 1999). "Findings will 
not be deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence in 
the record." Stewart, 145 Idaho at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256 (quoting State v. 
Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
C. Kingsley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying 
His Motion To Suppress 
Kinglsey contends on appeal that the district court erred in determining 
Detective Todd "[telling] Mr. Kingsley to get off the phone" was not a detention. 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) Not all encounters between the police and citizens rises 
to the level of a seizure: 
Only when an officer, by means of physical force or show of 
authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen may a court conclude that 
a seizure has occurred. A seizure does not occur simply because a 
police officer approaches an individual on the street or other public 
place, by asking if the individual is willing to answer some questions 
or by putting forth questions if the individual is willing to listen. 
Unless and until there is a detention, there is no seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and no constitutional rights 
have been infringed. Even when officers have no basis for 
suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask the 
individual questions and ask to examine identification. So long as 
police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests 
is required, the encounter is deemed consensual and no 
reasonable suspicion is required. 
State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 684, 263 P.3d 145, 149 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(internal case citations omitted). The test to determine if a seizure has in fact 
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taken place "is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to disregard the 
police, decline the officer's request, or otherwise terminate the encounter." lg. 
(citing State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843-44, 103 P.3d 454, 456-57 (2004)). 
Examples of circumstances that may indicate a seizure occurred, even if the 
person did not attempt to leave, include "the threatening presence of several 
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the 
person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Linenberger, 151 at 
684, 263 P.3d at 149 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 
(1980)). 
In the present case, Detective Todd "show[ed] [Kingsley] who [he] was" 
and told him to get off the phone, come down and talk to [him]." (12/08/11 Tr., 
p.8, Ls.15-17.) Detective Todd did not have his gun drawn. (12/08/11 p.8, 
Ls.10-13.) Detective Todd was on the sidewalk, about 20 feet away from where 
Kinglsey stood on the driveway, when he asked Kingsley to come talk to him. 
(10/11/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.2-7.) The district court noted the following: 
Other facts weighing in favor of there not being a detention are: 
Detective Todd was wearing plainclothes; it was daytime; there 
were other officers present, but none were engaged in the 
conversation between Detective Todd and Kingsley, they were 
instead focused on Andersen; the lack of demands or orders by 
Detective Todd; the cooperative nature of Kingsley in responding to 
Detective Todd's requests; and the complete absence of any 
physical restraint of Kingsley. 
(R., p.82.) 
When asked to come over to where Detective Todd was standing, 
Kingsley walked over to the sidewalk. (10/11/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-11.) There is 
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nothing in the record to suggest Kingsley was compelled to walk over to the 
officer, nor that Kinglsey could not have just turned and walked the other way. 
The detective asked Kingsley if he had any weapons on him, to which Kingsley 
replied he "had some glass on him." (10/11/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-12.) Kingsley 
consented to the officer taking it, telling Detective Todd that the item was in his 
front sweatshirt pocket. (10/11/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.15-20.) Once the officer took the 
"clear glass pipe," which he recognized as paraphernalia, from Kingsley's pocket, 
Kingsley volunteered that he had a "bindle in his left front pocket." ( 10/11 /11 Tr., 
p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.5.) 
From the point Kingsley told Detective Todd he had "glass" on his person, 
the detective had probable cause to arrest Kingsley for the possession of 
paraphernalia. A search incident to arrest is a well-settled exception to the 
warrant requirement. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The purpose of 
the search incident to arrest is to remove weapons from the arrestee's control, 
discover items that if left in the arrestee's control might facilitate an escape effort, 
and seize evidence of crime. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 228-29 
(1973). It is well established that a search incident to arrest is proper even if the 
search precedes a formal arrest, so long as probable cause to arrest a suspect 
exists at the time of the search. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980); 
State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 468, 988 P.2d 689, 694 (1999); State v. 
Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 351, 194 P.3d 550, 555 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. 
Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 282, 108 P.3d 424,429 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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Alternatively, notwithstanding Kingsley's assertion to the contrary, there 
was reasonable articulable suspicion to support a detention of Kingsley. 
Seizures of the person are evaluated under a Fourth Amendment standard of 
reasonableness. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-700 (1981). 
Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must be 
supported by probable cause. kl at 700; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
208 (1979). There are, however, certain exceptions to the probable cause 
requirement. For example, it is well-settled that a police officer may, in 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an 
individual if that officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that a person has 
committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 
(1968); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citing 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)). 
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the Court must 
consider the officer's training and experience and the reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from the facts available to the officer. See United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes 
deductions - inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained 
person . . .. [T]he evidence ... must be seen and weighed not in terms of library 
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law 
enforcement."); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 
2004) ("An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her 
possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience 
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and law enforcement training."). "Whether an officer possessed reasonable 
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the 
officer at or before the time of the stop." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 
1210 (citations omitted). 
Here, the evidence before the trial court was that the North Idaho Violent 
Crimes Task Force was conducting a probation check on a "known drug dealer." 
(10/11/11 Tr., p.3, L.20 - p.4, L.11.) Based on the training and experience of 
narcotics Detective Todd, "at a drug seller's home on a drug seller's block or 
parked in a car nearby there's often lookouts involved with narcotic activity." 
(12/08/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-6.) Seeing Kingsley talking on the phone in the driveway 
of a known drug dealer led Detective Todd to be concerned that Kingsley was in 
fact operating as a lookout for the drug dealer inside the home. (See 10/11/11 
Tr., p.4, Ls.10-11; 12/08/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.6-9.) Contrary to the district court's 
conclusion that the state presented no evidence that "Kingsley was engaged in a 
joint enterprise with Andersen or had a suspicious demeanor, made suspicious 
statements, or acted suspiciously" (R., p.65), it was not unreasonable for 
Detective Todd to suspect, in light of the fact that the North Idaho Violent Crimes 
Task Force was at the home to search the home known drug dealer who would 
likely have reason to utilize a lookout based on his known status as a drug dealer 
and Kingsley's presence on the property, that Kingsley was calling into the home 
to advise the occupants to dispose of drug evidence because law enforcement 
was approaching the home. 
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Although the record is limited as to Kingsley's connection to Andersen's 
residence, it is clear from his presence on Andersen's driveway making a phone 
call that he had some connection to Andersen and Andersen's house. It is not a 
normal course of events for people to walk onto the driveways of strangers to 
stop and place a call. Here, Kingsley was standing on the driveway in front of the 
garage where he could observe the four vehicles filled with law enforcement 
personnel approach the house. (10/11/11 Tr., p.4, Ls.1-12, p.9, L.20 - p.11, 
L.11.) It was then that Detective Todd made contact with Kingsley while the 
remaining officers went to the garage and home. It is entirely possible Kingsley 
chose that time to communicate to the people in the house that law enforcement 
was on their way in before being told to get off of the phone by Detective Todd. 
(10/11/11 Tr., p.4, Ls.20-23.) Immediately after making contact, Detective Todd 
asked Kingsley if he had any weapons. (10/11/11 Tr., p.4, L.25 - p.5, L.1.) 
Courts have regularly recognized the danger faced by officers when 
confronting drug enterprises and have frequently validated measures to increase 
officer safety in these situations even where other indicia that a suspect is armed 
and dangerous are absent. An individual's proximity to or involvement with drug 
transactions or distribution can support reasonable suspicion to frisk that 
individual in circumstances where the use of such techniques normally would not 
have been valid had the nature of the suspected criminal activity been 
considered less prone to violence. See~. United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 
1185, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding a frisk was valid where the officer 
"reasonably suspected that Johnson might be involved in drug dealing, 
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kidnapping, or prostitution" which are crimes "typically associated with some sort 
of weapon, often guns"); United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th 
Cir. 2005) ("Because weapons and violence are frequently associated with drug 
transactions, it is reasonable for an officer to believe that a person may be armed 
and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug 
transaction."); United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080, 1086 
(9th Cir. 2000) ("Because the police reasonably suspected [the defendant] of 
dealing in narcotics, it was not unreasonable to believe that he might be 
armed."); United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[W]hen [an] 
officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in [a] vehicle, the officer 
may, in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns, order the occupants 
out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons" given that "the 
indisputable nexus between drugs and guns presumptively creates a reasonable 
suspicion of danger to the officer."); United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 
1177 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a frisk of vehicle occupants was reasonable 
where an officer had observed large amounts of money on the front seat, 
believed that it was drug money, and became concerned for his safety "because 
persons involved with drugs often carry weapons"); State v. Bechtold, 783 P.2d 
1008, 1010 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (the fact that officers "knew that people involved 
in the manufacture and transportation of [methamphetamine] commonly carry 
weapons" was part of justification for the frisk). This proposition is supported by 
Terry itself where the Supreme Court recognized it was reasonable to assume 
from the nature of the offense contemplated that Terry was armed and 
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dangerous even though the officer had not observed a weapon or any physical 
indication of a weapon. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals followed suit in State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246, 
76 P.3d 990 (Ct. App. 2003). Having received consent to search the premises 
from a home's occupants who were being held on suspicion of manufacturing 
methamphetamine, an officer immediately frisked Dreier who emerged from the 
house prior to the officers' entrance. Dreier, 139 Idaho at 248-49, 76 P.3d at 
992-93. The Court of Appeals determined that Dreier's exit from a site of 
suspected illegal drug operations was significant in validating the pat down. 1 kl 
139 Idaho at 250-51, 76 P.3d at 994-95. The court specifically emphasized that: 
The officer's encounter with Dreier occurred at a home subject to 
search for suspected drug manufacturing activity. The danger 
posed to the safety of an officer conducting a search of premises 
suspected of housing an illegal drug operation is increased by the 
presence of a person found on the premises, who may be involved 
in the criminal activities therein. See State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 
296, 299-300, 47 P.3d 1266, 1269-70 (Ct. App. 2002) (The threat of 
violence to officers conducting a search of home suspected of 
housing an illegal drug operation is greater because of the 
recognized propensity of persons engaged in selling narcotics to 
carry firearms.). See also United States v. Patterson, 885 F.2d 
483, 485 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The possible danger presented by an 
individual approaching and entering a structure housing a drug 
operation is obvious. In fact, it would have been foolhardy for an 
objectively reasonable officer not to conduct a security frisk under 
the circumstances."). 
kl at 250, 76 P.3d at 994. 
The fact that an officer on the scene was aware that Dreier was a frequent 
visitor to the home and that he was known to carry a weapon was also 
considered by the court in its totality of the circumstances inquiry. Additionally, 
the court noted "nothing in the initial stages of the encounter served to dispel the 
officer's reasonable belief' that Dreier may have been armed and dangerous. 
When asked whether he had any weapons, Dreier had motioned to his side and 
indicated that he did. The officer then recovered a Leatherman tool from Dreier. 
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In State v. Crooks, 150 Idaho 117, 118-19, 244 P.3d 261, 262-63 (Ct. App. 
2010), law enforcement officers conducted a probation search of a home while 
waiting for a search warrant to be issued. After securing the residence, law 
enforcement performed pat-down searches of the individuals found in the home. 
1Jt 150 Idaho at 119, 244 P.3d at 263. An officer felt a hard object in Crooks' 
pocket and asked if it was anything he could use to harm the officers. 1Jt Crooks 
advised the officer it was a pipe and told the officer he could remove it from 
Crooks' pocket. ~ The pipe contained methamphetamine residue and Crooks 
was arrested and charged with possession of drug paraphernalia and possession 
of a controlled substance. 1Jt Crooks filed a motion to suppress, asserting the 
pat down of him violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 1Jt 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's denial of Crooks' motion 
to suppress, finding it reasonable to suspect those found in a home known to be 
a source of drug dealing could potentially pose a risk to law enforcement: 
In this case, Agent Sotka knew that drug transactions were 
occurring in the apartment - specifically that K.K. had just 
purchased drugs in the residence, and he had reason to believe 
Crooks was the supplier of at least some of the drugs sold there . 
. . . Crooks was present in a private residence associated with illegal 
drug activity, and several other persons were known to be 
associated with drug activity were also present. 
Given our recognition of the reasonableness of the belief 
that drug crimes are often accompanies by weapon use, and that 
the need to promptly neutralize this risk is crucial to officer safety, 
we conclude that the presence of organized or ongoing drug 
dealing is a factor to be considered when determining whether a 
frisk was lawful. 
150 Idaho at 122, 244 P.3d at 266. 
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With Detective Todd's knowledge that the task force was present to 
search Andersen's home for evidence of drug dealing, his experience with 
lookouts located near drug dealers' home, Kingsley's presence on a Andersen's 
driveway, while making a call, possibly calling into to alert the people inside the 
house, and the increased likelihood that people involved in the drug trade often 
use weapons, the totality of the circumstances before Detective Todd were 
sufficient to form reasonable suspicion that Kingsley was acting as a lookout for 
Andersen or had some other association and his drug dealing and was a 
potential threat to Detective Todd, thus justifying the officer's directive to Kingsley 
to hang up his phone and to ask him whether or not he had any weapons. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying Kinglsey's motion to suppress. 
Dated this 29th day of April 20~ 3. 
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